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II. Other Solutions for Fringe Economy
Lending

INTEREST RATE CAPS, STATE LEGISLATION, AND PUBLIC 
OPINION: DOES THE LAW REFLECT THE PUBLIC’S DESIRES?
TIMOTHY E. GOLDSMITH* AND NATHALIE MARTIN**
Are consumers aware of the law on interest rate caps? Do consumers 
support interest rate caps in general or in the context of specific types of 
loans? Do consumers know that it is legal to charge 400% or more per an-
num for a loan in some states? If they do know that such rates are legal in 
some states, do they find these rates acceptable or problematic? We recent-
ly sought answers to these and related questions through a public opinion 
poll in the state of New Mexico, a poor, primarily Democratic state.1 Be-
cause New Mexico has one of the highest consumer usage rates and highest 
concentrations of payday and title loan shops in the nation,2 we thought it 
would be an ideal place to measure the public’s knowledge of and interest 
in these ubiquitous loans.3 We also measured knowledge of interest rate 
caps in the context of credit cards, as a point of comparison.
* Timothy Goldsmith is a research psychologist in the Department of Psychology, University of New 
Mexico.
** Nathalie Martin is the Frederick M. Hart Chair in Consumer and Clinical Law, University of New 
Mexico School of Law. The author thanks the University of New Mexico School of Law for its finan-
cial support, Brian Parrish, Ernesto Longa, Sherri Thomas, and Jennifer Laws for their superb research 
assistance, and Frederick M. Hart, Karen Meyers, Jim Hawkins, and Jason Arvisu for their helpful 
editorial assistance. This paper was written in connection with a panel entitled Aberrant Contracts, at 
the 2013 AALS Meeting in Washington, D.C. 
1. State and County Quick Facts, UNITED STATES CENSUS BUREAU, http://quickfacts.
census.gov/qfd/states/35000.html (last visited on September 13, 2013) (showing a poverty rate of 19% 
compared to a national average of 14.3%); David Weigel, How the Democrats Won New Mexico: How 
did President Obama take New Mexico off the “swing state” map?, SLATE.COM (Oct. 9, 2012), 
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/politics/2012/10/new_mexico_has_become_a_safe_
democratic_state_because_of_a_growing_hispanic_population_native_americans_and_bad_republican
_talking_points_.html (reporting that New Mexico is now a safely democratic state and that ethnically, 
it is 46.7 percent Hispanic and 10.1 percent Native American).
2. McKernan, S., C. Ratcliffe, and D. Kuehn, Prohibitions, price caps, and disclosures: A look 
at state policies and alternative financial product use. Washington, D.C.: THE URBAN INSTITUTE, (Nov. 
2010). These authors found that in New Mexico, the usage rate of payday loans was 15%, compared to 
10% nationally, and that the usage rate for title loans was10% compared to 6% nationally. Id.
3. Author Nathalie Martin regularly speaks to the public about payday and title loans, both in 
and outside New Mexico. Understandably, people who live in states in which high-cost loans are ille-
gal, or in any case, less prevalent often express surprise when they learn that it is legal in some states to 
change 1,000% or more for consumer credit. What is alarming is that even people within New Mexico 
seem to have little knowledge that this lending is taking place. One highly educated 50-year old woman 
who was participating in a governor’s financial literacy Summit with Professor Martin in 2011 ex-
pressed disgust at the rates charged by pawnshops, which are capped at 48%. More recently, at a 2012, 
meeting of the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau held with leaders in Indian Country in New 
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Our data are consistent with that of previous studies showing that the 
general public overwhelmingly supports interest rate caps both in general 
and for certain types of loans. More uniquely, we also found that many 
consumers are unaware that there are no interest rate caps on many forms 
of consumer loans. These data are useful in explaining why consumers do 
not do more to change the law on interest rate caps.
Given that payday loans and other high-interest credit products are 
typically regulated through state statutes, these data raise fundamental 
questions about the efficacy of state legislation in regulating high-cost 
credit. More specifically, in situations in which there seems to be little to 
no political will among politicians to impose interest rate caps, does it mat-
ter that a majority of the general public believes there should be interest 
rate caps? Do these data suggest the need for more public education about 
the law and the legislative process, or is it simply a call for federal interest 
rate caps? Here, we report on these data, but do not attempt to answer these 
questions.
1.THE LAW AND POLITICS OF INTEREST RATE CAPS
A. The Law of Interest Rate Caps
There currently is no federal law regulating interest rates on consumer 
loans, although the Truth in Lending Act,4 the Electronic Fund Transfer 
Act,5 and other general federal laws apply to consumer lending. The issue 
of capping or limiting interest rates is thus left in the hands of state legisla-
tures. In some parts of the country, primarily eastern seaboard states, state 
law sometimes caps the amount of interest and fees a lender can charge a 
borrower for any type of consumer loan in a way that is, as Professor Chris-
topher Petersen describes it, undiluted and trim.6 If the cap is 18%, no 
lender can charge more than 18% for a loan of any kind, including fees, no 
exceptions.
In most of the country, however, undiluted and trim interest rate caps 
are rare indeed. More specifically, eighteen states plus the District of Co-
lumbia either forbid payday lending or cap interest rates in a fashion that 
Mexico, a high level official said he knew the loans were expensive but did not see how they could be 
400%. This is because the loans are advertised in terms of costs per two-week (for example, $15 per 
$100 borrowed) period or even per day ($2.00 per day, less than a coffee). 
4. Truth in Lending Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1601–1667f (2006).
5. Electronic Funds Transfer Act, 15 U.S.C. §§ 1693–1693r (2006). 
6. Christopher Petersen, Usury Law, Payday Loans, Statutory Sleight of Hand: Salience Distor-
tion in American Credit Pricing Limits, 92 MINN. L. REV. 1110, 1117 (2008).
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makes lending undesirable for lenders.7 The states that ban or cap payday 
loans at 36% or less are Arizona, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut, District 
of Columbia, Georgia, Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, Montana, New 
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Carolina, Ohio, Oregon, Penn-
sylvania, Vermont, and West Virginia.8
B. The Politics of Interest Rate Caps 
The politics of interest rate caps are sometimes counterintuitive. While 
one would think that Democratic states would be more likely to cap interest 
on consumer loans, given that Republican governments tend to eschew 
regulation that is not the case. Democratic states are no more likely to have 
interest rate caps than Republican ones. Of the states that do cap interest, 
four are swing states, ten are blue states, and ten are red states.9 In the blue 
state in which this study was completed, New Mexico,10 there has been a 
deep and abiding resistance to imposing interest rate caps on loans of any 
kind.11 Conversely, the red states of Montana and Arizona12 recently 
 7.  CORPORATION FOR ENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT, PROTECTIONS FROM PREDATORY SHORT-
TERM LOANS 2 (2012), available at http://cfed.org/assets/scorecard/2013/rg_PredatoryLending
_2013.pdf; See also Payday Lending Statutes, NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF STATE LEGISLATURES,
http://www.ncsl.org/issues-research/banking/payday-lending-state-statutes.aspx (last updated Sept. 12, 
2013). 
 8.  CORPORATION FOR ENTERPRISE DEVELOPMENT, supra note 7; See also Payday Lending 
Statutes, supra note 7. 
 9.  Red and Blue States Map (Average Margins of Presidential Victory), WIKIMEDIA COMMONS,
http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Red_and_Blue_States_Map_(Average_Margins_of_Presidenti
al_Victory).svg (last modified Feb. 16, 2013). 
 10.  Id.
 11.  Payday lenders began appearing in New Mexico after the state repealed its General Usury 
statute (former N.M. STAT. ANN. § 56-8-11-1) in 1991. Prior to the summer of 2007, New Mexico 
was one of only two states that had no regulation of payday lending. Alexander Bartik et al., Regulating 
Predatory Payday Lending: A State-by-State Analysis, ROOSEVELT INST. AT YALE CTR. ON ECON.
POL’Y (2007), available at https://www.efis.psc.mo.gov/mpsc/commoncomponents/viewdocument.asp?
DocId=935476227, (last visited September 13, 2013). The other state is Wisconsin, which still has no 
payday lending regulation. For five very long and frustrating years, the New Mexico Legislature debat-
ed various payday-lending statutes.  
Finally, during the legislative session of 2007, the New Mexico State Legislature adopted a set of 
changes to the New Mexico Small Loan Act of 1955 intended to address payday lending in New Mexi-
co. These regulations went into effect in July 2007. The new law capped interest and fees at $15 per 
$100, which results in an effective interest rate of 390% or higher, but the new law applied only to 
lenders engaged in the business of lending amounts of $2,500.00 or less, and defined a loan covered by 
the Act as one of 14 to 35 days in duration, for which the consumer gives the lender a check or debit 
authorization for the amount of the loan plus interest and fees. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 58-15-3(A) (West 
2013). In the end, this narrow definition gutted the legislation. The industry quickly switched to loan 
products that fall outside the statute, namely longer loans or those not involving a post-dated check. 
None of the new loans (typically called “installment loans”) are regulated at all in the state. Thus, the 
state spent several years attempting to regulate payday lending but the resulting law has done nothing to 
change short-term lending or high interest rates. 
 12.  Arizona Payday Loan Reform, Proposition 200 (2008), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/
wiki/index.php/Arizona_Payday_Loan_Reform,_Proposition_200_(2008) (last modified May 28, 2012) 
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kicked payday lenders out of their states, because, as a Montana ballot 
campaign explained, “400% is too much.”13
C. A Look into the Loan Products in States without Caps
One might wonder what loans and lending practices look like in states 
in which interest rates are generally not capped. How high are the rates at 
which consumers borrow? Who uses high-cost loans? Even assuming that 
most borrowers are low-income borrowers with poor credit histories and 
thus few other lending options,14 do rates respond to market forces and 
drop when more lenders enter a market? At least as to this last question, the 
answer seems to be no. Thus far, market forces have had little to no effect 
on interest rates for most high-cost loans.15 Indeed, despite that high-cost 
lending is the fastest growing segment of the consumer lending business,16
(voters in Arizona defeated a payday sponsored ballot initiative, mandating an end to state statutes that 
allow 400% interest rates); Montana Loan Interest Rate Limit, I-164 (2010), BALLOTPEDIA,
http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/Montana_Loan_Interest_Rate_Limit,_I-164_(2010) (last modified 
July 6, 2012).
13. Celinda Lake & Joshua Ulibarri, Results of a Statewide Survey on a Montana Ballot Initiative 
to Cap Interest Rates of Predatory Lenders, LAKE RESEARCH PARTNERS (January 2010), 
http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/Publicmemo-MT-Payday.pdf; Payday Lenders Less Popular than 
Liquor Stores, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING (Feb. 23, 2011), http://www.responsiblelending.org/
media-center/press-releases/archives/Payday-lenders-less-popular-than-liquor-stores-majority-of-voters
-would-support-moratorium-according-to-San-Jos%C3%A9-poll.html#; Poll Shows Support for Cap-
ping Payday Loan Rates and Fees, THE VINDICATOR (January 25, 2013), http://www.thevin
dicator.com/news/article_2d0406f0-6714-11e2-997e-0019bb2963f4.html; Montana Loan Interest Rate 
Limit, BALLOTPEDIA, supra note 12 (reporting that nearly 72% of Montana voters voted to cap interest 
rates on payday and auto title loans at 36% APR); Ohio Payday Lender Interest rate Cap, Issue 5 
(2008), BALLOTPEDIA, http://ballotpedia.org/wiki/index.php/Ohio_Payday_Lender_ Interest_Rate_Cap
,_Issue_5_(2008) (last modified Aug. 8, 2013).
14. This assumption may be wholly incorrect, but this is clearly what lenders say to justify their 
products and existence. See Karen E. Francis, Rollover, Rollover: A Behavioral Law and Economics 
Analysis of the Payday-Loan Industry, 88 TEX. L. REV. 611, 617 (2010) (“No matter which studies 
most accurately describe the loan-market participants, clearly payday borrowers are low-to-moderate-
income individuals, many of whom have alternative credit sources or easily accessible cash.”).
15. At least with respect to payday loans, increased numbers of lenders has not driven down 
prices. See Michael A. Garemko III, Note, Texas’s New Payday Lending Regulations: Effective Debi-
asing Entails More Than the Right Message, 17 TEX. J. C. L. & C. R. 211, 219-20 (2012); Nathalie 
Martin, 1,000% Interest—Good While Supplies Last: A Study of Payday Loan Practices and Solutions,
52 ARIZ. L. REV. 563, 614 (2010) (stating, “The payday lending and other short-term lending industries 
are classic failed markets. The industry is young, having developed primarily in the 1990s. Thus, price 
competition is not yet necessary to create a strong market share. Rather, most lenders charge similar 
amounts for the same loan, typically the largest amount permitted by law.”). Title loans may be some-
what different, however. Professor Jim Hawkins has found that that lenders compete on price at some 
level at least in Texas. See Jim Hawkins, Credit on Wheels: The Law and Business of Auto Title Lend-
ing, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 535, 558-59 (2012).
16. 2011 Underbanked Market Sizing Study, CTR. FOR FIN. SERVS. INNOVATION, Nov. 2012, at 1, 
available at
http://www.cfsinnovation.com/system/files/CFSI_2011_Underbanked_Market_Sizing_Study_Novembe
r_2012.pdf. This is a newsletter for the Center for Financial Services Innovation (CFSI), which claims 
to be: 
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rates seem to hover between 400% and 1,000% on the most common high-
cost loan products, regardless of how many lenders enter the market.
There are many varieties of high-cost loans, each with a variety of 
terms. One example is the so-called “installment loan” created to skirt a 
New Mexico state law requiring loans made for fourteen to thirty-five days 
to limit interest and fees to $15 per $100 borrowed for up to fourteen days 
per loan. In one such installment loan, described in a recent case brought 
against a lender by the state Attorney General’s Office, a customer bor-
rowed $100, to be repaid in twenty-six bi-weekly installments of $40.16 
each, plus a final installment of $55.24.17 In total, this borrower paid $100 
in principal and $999.71 in interest for a total of $1,099.71 on the $100 
loan. The annual percentage rate on the loan was 1,147%.18
Another example of a common form of high-cost loan in a state with-
out caps is a true “payday” loan, so named because its original purpose was 
to help a customer to survive a short-term cash flow crisis between the time 
of the loan and the customer’s next payday.19 In a typical loan, a consumer 
borrows money at a rate of between $15 and $25 per $100, between now 
and payday, meaning for a period of fourteen days or less.20 For example, 
if a consumer got paid four days ago but is already out of cash, she can 
borrow $390 from a payday lender and pay it back on her next payday, now
ten days away. To get that $390 at the $15 per $100 rate, she would need a 
The nation’s leading authority on financial services for underserved consumers. Through in-
sights gained by producing original research; promoting cross-sector collaboration; advising 
organizations and companies by offering specialized consulting services; shaping public poli-
cy; and investing in nonprofit organizations and start-ups, CFSI delivers a deeply intercon-
nected suite of services benefiting underserved consumers.” A pro-payday and title loan 
industry group, CFSI’s research is funded by Morgan Stanley.
Id. at 8. See also Fahzy Abdul-Rahman, Small-Dollar Predatory Lending and Bad Loans, GUIDE G-260
(Coop. Extension Serv., Coll. of Agric., Consumer, and Envtl. Sciences, La Cruces, NM), November 
2012, available at, http://aces.nmsu.edu/pubs/_g/G260.pdf. Abdul-Rahman reports that between 1992 
and 2000, the number of predatory lenders in New Mexico grew from one per 66,000 citizens to one for 
every 5,212 citizens. Id. He also notes that:
In New Mexico, the highest concentrations of predatory lending stores tend to be in smaller 
cities and cities with high minority populations and/or high poverty rates, such as Gallup (880 
people per lender), Grants (881 people per lender), and Farmington (1,647 people per lender), 
which collectively represent six times the rate in the rest of New Mexico in 2000.
Id. (citation omitted).
17. See New Mexico, ex rel., Gary K. King v. B & B Inv. Grp., No. D-01010CV-2009-01916 at 1-
2 (1st Dist. NM, Dec. 3, 2010); see also Felix Salmon, Loan Sharking Datapoints of the Day, REUTERS 
(Jan. 6, 2010), http://blogs.reuters.com/felix-salmon/2010/01/07/loan-sharking-datapoints-of-the-day/.
18. King, No. D-01010CV-2009-01916 at 1-2.
19. See Ronald J. Mann & Jim Hawkins, Just Until Payday, 54 UCLA L. REV. 855, 857 (2007) 
(explaining the mechanics of a typical payday loan); Francis, supra note 14, at 611-12 (describing a 
payday loan transaction).
20. See Nathalie Martin, 1,000% Interest—Good While Supplies Last: A Study of Payday Loan 
Practices and Solutions, 52 ARIZ. L. REV. 563, 564 (2010) (giving an example of a typical payday 
loan).
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checking account. She would write a check or authorize an automatic debit 
for $460, post-dated to her next payday.21 When payday comes, she can 
either let the check or debit clear, assuming the unlikely event that she now 
has this money, or she can go in and pay another $60 to borrow the same 
$390 for the next two weeks. The annual percentage rate for a loan of this 
kind is 400% or more, depending on the number of days for which the loan 
remains outstanding.22
Still another example of a common high-cost loan product in a state 
without caps is the auto title loan, for which customers do not need bank 
accounts.23 Rather, they simply need an unencumbered automobile, which 
secures the loan. These loans carry a typical interest rate of 25% per month, 
or 300% per annum.24 While title loans usually carry lower interest rates 
than payday loans, they tend to be larger loans, increasing the chances that 
they will be difficult to repay and will create debt traps.25 They also subject 
the borrower to the possibility of losing their vehicle, a risk not endured 
with the other forms of high-cost loans described here.26
These are but a few examples of the types of loans that are available to 
consumers in states without caps.
II. PUBLIC OPINION ON INTEREST RATE CAPS AND OTHER LIMITS ON 
PAYDAY-STYLE LENDING
Our data augment a large body of existing data showing public sup-
port for interest rate caps either in general, or in the context of payday-style 
loans. For example, in Montana, 75% of the population supported a ballot 
21. Id.
22. While some lenders argue that it is inappropriate to state a loan like this in terms of annual 
percentage rate, because the loans are short-term loans, they are not actually used as short-term credit. It 
is common for borrowers to have numerous loans per year and to roll them over repeatedly so borrow-
ers are in loan like this most of the time. See Francis, supra note 14, at 613, 617-18.
23. Kathryn Fritzdixon, Jim Hawkins & Paige Marta Skiba, Dude, Where’s My Car Title?: The 
Law, Behavior, and Economics of Title Lending Markets, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014); 
Nathalie Martin & Ozymandias Adams, Grand Theft Auto Loans: Repossession and Demographic 
Realities in Title Lending, 77 MO. L. REV. 41 (2012).
24. See Martin & Adams, supra note 23, at 60; Hawkins, Fritzdixon & Skiba, supra note 23, at 2.
25. See Martin & Adams, supra note 23, at 74. Notably, Professor Jim Hawkins has found that 
borrowers do not fully understand the costs of title loans. See Hawkins, supra note 15, at 557. The 
people he surveyed did not exhibit an understanding of the high relative cost of title loans compared to 
credit card debt. Only 25.71% (n = 9) recognized that a title loan is a lot more expensive than credit 
card debt, while 17.14% (n = 6) thought a title loan is a lot less expensive than credit card debt. 5.71% 
(n = 2) thought a title loan was a little less expensive than credit card debt, and 31.43% (n = 11) thought 
the two were about the same cost. While this small sample of people may not be indicative of borrowers 
generally, it is disturbing how few people understood the relative cost of their title loan.”
26. Martin & Adams, supra note 23, at 78-80, 85-86.
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initiative capping interest on all consumer loans at 36%.27 Similarly, after 
hearing that payday and title lenders can charge 500% or more in Texas, 
63% of Texans age forty-five or older strongly agreed that the state should 
cap interest rates and fees, with 79% of respondents reporting that they 
believe the cap should be 36% or less.28 In another survey taken by the 
Texas Fair Lending Alliance29 as well as Texas Faith for Fair Lending, 
between 79% and 85% of people polled favored capping interest rates on 
payday and auto title loans at 36% APR or less.30
In Iowa, survey data show that seven in ten Iowans believe payday 
loan rates and fees should be capped.31 Arizonans overwhelmingly voted to 
end payday lending in the state.32 Similarly, in 2008, 63% of Ohioans vot-
ed to cap interest in the state at 28%.33 In Rhode Island, the only state in 
New England to allow payday lending, a public poll showed that 76% of 
27. Results of a Statewide Survey on a Montana Ballot Initiative to Cap Interest Rates of Preda-
tory Lenders, LAKE RESEARCH PARTNERS (Jan. 2010), http://www.consumerfed.org/pdfs/Publicmemo-
MT-Payday.pdf; CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, supra note 13; Montana Loan Interest Rate Limit,
BALLOTPEDIA, supra note 13 (reporting that nearly 72% of Montana voters voted to cap interest rates 
on payday and auto title loans at 36% APR); Ohio Payday Lender Interest Rate Cap, BALLOTPEDIA,
supra note 13.
28. Summary of AARP Poll of Texans Age 45+, AARP (Jan. 2013), http://www.aarp.org/content/
dam/aarp/research/surveys_statistics/econ/2013/Summary-of-AARP-Poll-of-Texans-Age-45-Plus-
Opinions-on-Payday-Loan-Rates-and-Legislation-AARP.pdf; THE VINDICATOR, supra note 13; Payday 
and Auto Title Lending, LBJ SCHOOL OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS, CENTER FOR POLITICS AND GOVERNANCE,
http://www.utexas.edu/lbj/cpg/docs/f3_2013_payday.pdf (last visited Sept. 20, 2013) (containing an 
excellent summary of existing Texas law).
29. The Texas Fair lending Alliance is a Texas coalition comprised of more than three-dozen 
financial, community and faith organizations a group dedicated to bringing increased regulation to the 
payday loan industry. Texas Fair Lending Alliance, UNITED WAY HOUSTON, http://www.unitedway
houston.org/default/Texas%20Fair%20Lending%20Alliance-%20AEI%20Presentation.pdf (last visit-
ed Oct. 6, 2013).
30. Rudolph Bush, Statewide Survey Shows Broad Support for Payday Lending Reform, DALLAS 
NEWS CITY HALL BLOG (June 21, 2012, 9:41 AM), http://cityhallblog.dallasnews.com/2012
/06/statewide-survey-shows-broad-support-for-payday-lending-reform.html/ (reporting that 79% of 
Texans polled favored capping interest rates on payday and auto title loans at 36% APR or less); THE 
VINDICATOR, supra note 13.
31. Iowans for Payday Loan Reform: Iowa Poll Reveals Strong Bi-partisan Support for Payday 
Lending Reform, IowaPolitics.com (Jan. 26, 2011), http://www.iowapolitics.com/index.iml
?Article=224730 (reporting that 7 in 10 Iowans called for capped payday loan interest rates).
32. Arizona Payday Loan Reform, BALLOTPEDIA, supra note 12 (voters in Arizona defeated a 
payday sponsored ballot initiative, mandating an end to state statutes that allow 400% interest rates).
Title loans are not restricted in Arizona, however, causing lenders to morph from payday loans to title 
loans. See Maureen West, Payday Lenders Morphing Into Auto Title Lenders, AARP (Dec. 10, 2010), 
http://www.aarp.org/money/scams-fraud/info-12-2010/payday_lenders_morphing_into_auto_title_
lenders.html.
33. Ohio Payday Lender Interest Rate Cap, BALLOTPEDIA, supra note 13 (reporting that over 
63% of Ohio voters voted in favor of capping the Ohio payday loan industry’s interest rate at 28%); 
2010 Payday Lending Poll Results, CATHOLIC CONFERENCE OF OHIO (April 29, 2010), 
http://www.ohiocathconf.org/i/EJ/GraphWork04.pdf.
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Rhode Islanders supported capping interest on payday loans.34 Citizens of 
Kentucky similarly voted for a 36% cap on all loans.35 Finally, in Colora-
do, voters agreed there was a need for a similar 36% cap.36 On the national 
front, a survey by the Center for Responsible Lending showed that three 
out of four Americans who expressed an opinion thought that Congress 
should cap interest rates, and 72% felt that the caps should be no higher 
than 36%.37 Indeed, no study has found a public desire not to cap interest 
rates.
Additionally, as the next section describes, the public seems to think 
such caps are in place even when they are not, suggesting that people are 
ill-informed about what the law actually provides. Our data show that at 
least in one small state with huge numbers of high-cost lenders, many peo-
ple simply have no idea that 500% and 1,000% loans exist and perhaps 
more critically, they are uniformly surprised to hear that this type of lend-
ing is legal.38
III. THE STUDY
A. Introduction to Study Methodology
The purpose of our study was to assess the public’s understanding of 
and attitudes about financial practices associated with borrowing and lend-
ing. We wondered how knowledgeable the general public is about current 
34. Press Release, R.I. Office of the Gen. Treasurer, Coalition, Raimondo, Taveras Raise Aware-
ness on Payday Lending Pitfalls (Apr. 17, 2012), http://www.ri.gov/press/view/16334 (reporting that 
76% of Rhode Islanders polled support capping payday loan interest rates); 2010 Payday Lending Poll
Results, supra note 33.
35. Kentucky Voters Support a 36 Percent Rate Cap on Payday Loans, Despite Database and Job 
Loss Threat, KY. COALITION FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING, http://kyresponsiblelending.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/10/Poll-data-fact-sheet.pdf (last visited Sept. 19, 2013).
36. Isabel Nicholson, The Truth About Payday Loans: How Hardworking Coloradans Take the 
Bait and Get Caught in a Cycle of Debt, BELL POL. CTR. (Feb. 15, 2008), https://bellpolicy.org/
sites/default/files/PUBS/IssBrf/2008/02PaydayLoansweb.pdf.
37. Congress Should Cap Interest Rates, CTR. FOR RESPONSIBLE LENDING (March 2009), 
http://www.responsiblelending.org/payday-lending/policy-legislation/congress/interest-rate-survey.pdf;
Christopher L. Peterson, ‘Warning: Predatory Lender’ - A Proposal for Candid Predatory Small Loan 
Ordinances, 69 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 893 (2012), available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1971971
(“Over a hundred different local governments around the country have adopted ordinances restricting 
high cost, small loans. This trend reflects the solid majority of the American public that opposes the 
legality of triple-digit interest rate loans and the long historical tradition of treating payday and car-title 
lending as a serious civil offense or even a crime.”).
Id. at 893-95, n.1 (citing CTR. FOR POL. ENTREPRENEURSHIP, Poll on Payday Lending Legislation (Feb. 
15, 2008), available at http://www.c-pe.org/download/PaydayLendingReform/PollPaydayLending.pdf
(stating that a weighted sample of 500 Colorado voters found “74% of respondents are in favor of 
proposed legislation that will set a cap of 36% on the interest and fees that a company can charge for 
payday loans”).
38. See infra notes 42-49 and accompanying text.
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interest rates for various types of loans. We were also interested in what 
views people held regarding the role of government regulation in borrow-
ing and lending, and more particularly, whether governments should cap 
interest on loan products. In the state in which our study was conducted, 
there are no interest rate caps for most loans,39 and high-cost lenders and 
products are ubiquitous. This circumstance allowed us to test the hypothe-
sis that people were unaware of the high interest rates even in a place in 
which high cost loans were extremely common. We gathered data on these 
and other topics and then investigated relationships between respondents’ 
financial beliefs and attitudes on the one hand, and various personal de-
mographics such as education and religiosity on the other. The results of 
the study have potential implications for influencing new legislation and 
revising existing legislation governing the high-cost lending industry.
B. Methods
We developed a twenty-eight-item survey to assess people’s 
knowledge and beliefs about various financial issues. The questions and 
data discussed in this article are contained in Appendix A. The survey was 
administered to two separate groups of respondents through the Opinio 
survey system. Participants responded to the Internet survey at their own
convenience using personal computers available to them.
Subjects. A group of 105 college students participated in the survey to 
partially fulfill a research requirement in an undergraduate psychology 
course. A second group of ninety-four participants was solicited through 
ads placed in local newspapers in several large cities throughout New Mex-
ico. The public participants were remunerated with a $10 Wal-Mart card. 




We compared the college students and the general population by per-
forming a chi-square test of independence40 on the two groups’ answers to 
each question. The groups differed significantly on several items, but these 
were mostly demographic questions such as age, education level, occupa-
39. For one exception, see Bartik, supra note 11 and accompanying text.
40. .DAVID C. HOWELL, FUNDAMENTAL STATISTICS FOR BEHAVIORAL SCIENCES 502-531 (7th. 
ed. 2010), available at http://yunika1106.files.wordpress.com/2013/03/fundamental-statistics-behav
ioral-sciences.pdf.
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tion, and income—characteristics that would be expected to differ between 
a college group and the general population. In addition, we observed that 
students were less likely to have taken out loans, had borrowed less money 
on loans when they did take out loans, and guessed the annual percentage 
interest rates of loans as being somewhat lower compared to the public 
group. However, there were no significant differences for the remaining 
questions, so we combined the results for the two groups into a single sam-
ple of 199 participants to simplify analysis and reporting of the findings.
Appendix A shows the proportions of responses to each question for 
the combined sample of participants. The respondents were roughly two-
thirds female, 50% students, and 60% thirty years of age or younger. Sev-
enty percent had an annual income of $30,000 or less, and about two-thirds 
had graduated from high school or had some college education. Approxi-
mately 45% were registered Democrats and 42% percent identified them-
selves as either liberal or very liberal in their political/social views. In 
addition, 40% of the respondents identified themselves as either religious 
or very religious and 30% were Catholic, the largest religious category.
2. Findings Related to Beliefs about Interest Rate Caps
a. Credit Card Interest Rates
Questions 6 through 14 related to consumers’ use and knowledge of 
the law related to credit cards.41 Because part of the purpose of this Article 
is to share our finding that the public lacks knowledge about the laws of 
interest caps, as well as our findings of broad public bipartisan support for 
interest rate caps, this discussion focuses on questions related to these two 
topics. More information on related questions is available in Appendix A. 
As a starting point, 45% of the respondents had borrowed money on a cred-
it card and most of these had carried over a balance from month-to-month. 
Question 6 asked, “When borrowing money with a credit card, do you be-
lieve the current law limits or caps the maximum annual percentage interest 
rate that a lender can charge?” Over 58% of participants thought that the 
current law does limit the amount of interest rates a credit card company 
can charge. In fact, the law contains no such limit, showing that well over 
half of the public is misinformed about the protections the law provides 
with respect to credit card interest rate caps.
41. More specifically, Questions 1-14 related to how often consumers pay off credit cards in full, 
what the actual interest rates are on credit cards, and whether the participants use credit cards, and what 
sized balances they carry, the results of which can be found infra Appendix A.
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Question 7 asked those who thought there was a cap on interest rates 
on credit cards which of the following annual percentage rates (10% or 
lower, 25%, 50%, 200% or higher) was closest to the maximum annual 
percentage interest rate allowed by law for money borrowed on a credit 
card. Over 48% of participants thought the rate was 25% or lower, with 
25% being the most common rate chosen by those who thought there was a 
cap. Question 8 asked “When borrowing money with a credit card, do you 
think the current law should limit or cap the annual percentage interest rate 
a lender can charge?” Over 90% of participants thought that the law should 
limit rates on credit card interest. Question 9 asked those who thought there 
should be a cap what that cap should be, giving the following choices: 10% 
or lower, 25%, 50%, 100%, or 200% or higher. Nearly 53% of participants 
thought the rate should be 10% or lower and over 29% thought the credit 
card rate cap should be 25%. Collectively then, over 82% of all participants 
thought credit card interest rates should be capped at 25% or less.
Question 10 asked participants to assume that Sally, a hypothetical 
consumer, charged items on her credit card, and that the credit card compa-
ny knew that Sally would not be able to pay back the amount borrowed. 
The question then asked participants whether they believe it was legal for 
the lender to still lend her the money. The majority of the participants, 
nearly 59%, incorrectly thought the loan was illegal if the lender knew 
Sally had no ability to repay the loan. In the U.S., knowledge of an inability 
to repay a loan rarely affects the legality of a loan and certainly does not do 
so in the context of credit card debt.42 Once again, these data show that the 
public is misinformed about the law related to credit card debt.
b. Storefront or Short-term Loans
Questions 15-23 related to participants’ knowledge and use of store-
front loans or short-term loans, which were defined in the study as a loan 
“due either on your next payday or in some other short period of time”
where “[y]ou may also have to give your car title in exchange for the mon-
ey.” The definition of short-term loan was written broadly enough to incor-
porate payday loans, title loans, and triple-digit interest rate “installment 
loans,” a relatively new product in New Mexico designed to get around a 
42. See John Pottow, Ability to Pay, 8 BERKELEY BUS. L.J. 175, 175-77 (2011). This article 
discusses how new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau rules allow the agency to consider whether 
mortgage borrowers had an ability to pay when considering whether a mortgage loan is enforceable. 
The article also notes that considering a borrower’s ability to pay is a total sea change in the world of 
U.S. consumer lending, calling it a “profoundly transformative innovation.” Id. at 176. The article also 
notes that considering a borrower’s ability to pay is common in European consumer law. See id. at 189-
91.
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new law limiting the rate on payday loans to 417% or less.43 Question 15 
asked, “When borrowing money with a short-term loan, do you believe the 
current law limits or caps the maximum annual percentage interest rate that 
a lender can charge?” Roughly 56% of participants said no, which is cor-
rect because as a general matter, New Mexico law does not cap interest on 
consumer loans.44
Even though nearly half of the participants (almost 44%) were igno-
rant of the law on interest rate caps and short-term loans, we were actually 
a bit surprised that so many New Mexicans knew that short-term loans car-
ried no interest rate caps. One of us who works and writes in the area of 
payday and title loans extensively rarely encounters anyone in the middle 
class who knows that these rates are not capped. Perhaps people were more 
aware of the law than we expected because a rather astounding 23% of our 
participants reported having taken out a short-term loan. Previous New 
Mexico data show that 15% of New Mexicans use payday loans and that 
10% use title loans.45 These percentages are much higher than the estimat-
ed 5% of the population nationally that use high-cost payday or title 
loans.46 New Mexico’s high-cost loan usage rates could be even higher 
than we found, given that we only advertised our survey in major metropol-
itan areas, and that payday and title loan shops are even more concentrated 
in smaller towns in our state.47
Question 16 asked those people who thought there was a cap on store-
front or short-term loans to predict which of five categories of rates they 
believed was the maximum annual rate. Only a tiny percentage of people in 
43. See Martin, supra note 20, at 564 (description of the ways in which lenders have tried to get 
around existing laws and an example of a typical payday loan and a typical installment loan); Martin & 
Adams, supra note 23, at 42-43 (description of a typical title loan). Id. at 91 n.221. The survey instru-
ment described a short–term loan as follows: During the next several questions you will be asked about 
short-term loans. By short-term loan we mean a loan taken out at a storefront lender and is usually due 
either on your next payday or in some other short period of time. You may also have to give your car 
title in exchange for the money. You will be asked what you think the law is, as well as what you think 
the law should be with respect to short-term loans.
44. See Bartik, supra note 11. New Mexico attempted to cap interest on payday loans at around 
390% but the law contained a large loophole, through which lenders began offering payday loans 
without post-dated checks, which placed the loans outside the statute and made them completely unreg-
ulated. Technically then, payday loans are capped at 390% in the state and there is no cap on all other 
loans.
45. See Appendix A, Question 22; McKernan, Ratcliffe, & Kuehn, supra note 2. These authors 
found that in New Mexico, the usage rate of payday loans was 15%, compared to 10% nationally, and 
that the usage rate for title loans was10% compared to 6% nationally. While our 23% at first seemed 
higher than previous data from New Mexico, our data include payday and title loan usage, as well as 
other short-term loan like high-interest installment loans.
46. Payday Lending in America, PEW CHARITABLE TRUST 22-23 (July 2012), available at
http://www.pewstates.org/uploadedFiles/PCS_Assets/2012/Pew_Payday_Lending_Report.pdf. (finding 
that 5.5% of borrowers reported using payday loans nationally).
47. Abdul-Rahman, supra note 16, at 1.
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New Mexico who thought there was a cap on interest for storefront or 
short-term loans believed such a cap was 200% or more. Since existing 
loans carry a rate of far greater than 200%, these data are further evidence 
that many people are generally unaware of the true high cost of high-cost 
lending.
Question 17 asked, “When borrowing money with a short-term loan, 
do you think the current law should limit or cap the maximum annual per-
centage interest rate a lender can charge?” Approximately 86% of partici-
pants thought that the current law should cap interest and fees on storefront 
or short-term loans. Question 18 asked those who thought rates should be
capped for storefront or short-term loans to choose a rate at which such 
loans should be capped. When faced with choices of 10% or lower, 25%, 
50%, 100%, or 200% or higher, over 72% of participants felt that the clos-
est approximation of the rate at which these loans should be capped was 
25% or less. Interestingly, people who had themselves taken out short term 
loans were more in favor of interest rate caps than the general public, 
though not by a large margin. Over 95% of those who had taken out a 
short-term loan favored caps on short-term loans, whereas less than 85% of 
those who had not done so favored such caps.
Similar to the question asked with respect to credit cards, Question 19 
asked participants to assume that our hypothetical consumer, Sally, took 
out a short-term loan, and that the lender knew that Sally would not be able 
to pay back the amount borrowed. It then asked participants if they thought 
the loan was legal. Approximately 56% of participants thought such a loan 
would not be legal, despite that, as with credit cards, the ability to pay back 
a short-term loan such as a payday, title loan, or installment loan, does not 
affect the legality of the loan.48 Additionally, Question 21 asked partici-
48. This will change under the new Consumer Financial Protection Bureau regulations. As enact-
ed, Dodd-Frank Section 1411(b) amends the Truth In Lending Act (“TILA”) Chapter 2, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1631-51 (2006), by inserting a new section 129C. 15 U.S.C.A § 1639c (2013 West). Title XIV of 
Dodd-Frank is subtitled the “Mortgage Reform and Anti-Predatory Lending Act,” and Section 1411 
provides the following new obligation on all mortgage lenders (originators and brokers):
Minimum standards for residential mortgage loans.
(a) Ability to Repay. —
(1) In general. —In accordance with regulations prescribed by the Board, no credi-
tor may make a residential mortgage loan unless the creditor makes a reasonable 
and good faith determination based on verified and documented information that, at 
the time the loan is consummated, the consumer has a reasonable ability to repay 
the loan, according to its terms, and all applicable taxes, insurance (including mort-
gage guarantee insurance), and assessments.
Id. Dodd-Frank also provides that:
(3) Basis for determination. —A determination under this subsection of a consumer’s ability 
to repay a residential mortgage loan shall include consideration of the consumer’s credit his-
tory, current income, expected income the consumer is reasonably assured of receiving, cur-
rent obligations, debt-to-income ratio or the residual income the consumer will have after 
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pants to predict the actual rate of interest on short-term loans. While 19% 
accurately reported that the typical loan rates were 200% or more, the other 
81% had no idea that rates on payday, title, or installment loans were 200% 
per annum or higher. These data show a huge lack of awareness of the true 
cost of high-cost credit.
3. Cross-tabulated Data
As set out above, we also cross-tabulated data between pairs of ques-
tions. This analysis allowed us to investigate whether respondents who 
tended to answer a question in one way also tended to answer a second 
question in a certain way, and thus allowed us to examine the relationship 
between two different characteristics. For example, are socially conserva-
tive people (Question 25) more likely to oppose government regulation of 
interest rates (Question 28) than liberals? These crosstab analyses are more 
complex to perform and report, but they can uncover interesting relation-
ships among participants’ beliefs. The results are reported in Appendix B, 
in Tables B1 through B3. A significant chi-square test (i.e., p < .05) indi-
cates that a person’s response to one question tended to dictate their re-
sponse to the other question. There were 124 statistically significant cross-
tab relationships in all, but many of these were expected dependencies be-
tween demographic characteristics, such as older respondents were more 
educated and had higher incomes. Appendix B shows significant crosstab 
relationships for selected questions. For each crosstab analysis, we report 
the conditional proportions of respondents in each row along with the re-
sults of a chi-square test.
Table B1 shows that in our sample of respondents, men were more 
conservative than women. The male-to-female ratio varied from 60:40 for 
those identifying as very conservative to 28:72 for those identifying as very 
liberal. Interestingly, there was little difference in the male to female ratios 
for political party (Question 24),49 religious affiliation (Question 26), or 
paying non-mortgage debt and mortgage-related obligations, employment status, and other fi-
nancial resources other than the consumer’s equity in the dwelling. . . . A creditor shall de-
termine the ability of the consumer to repay using a payment schedule that fully amortizes the 
loan over the term of the loan.
Id. The Credit Card Act provides a similar provision with respect to credit cards. Credit Card Account-
ability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009, Pub. L. No. 111-24, § 109, 124 Stat. 1743 (2009) 
(“A card issuer may not open any credit card account for any consumer under an open end consumer 
credit plan, or increase any credit limit applicable to such account, unless the card issuer considers the 
ability of the consumer to make the required payments under the terms of such account.”). See general-
ly Pottow, supra note 42 (discussing the Dodd-Frank’s Act’s ramifications on the credit industry).
49. We acknowledge that political party affiliation does not predict attitudes on all issues and also 
that many complex attitudes go into determining whether a person believes or does not believe that 
interest rates on consumer loans should be capped. Given these complexities, our only goal was to test 
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religious beliefs (Question 27). The political/social distinction between 
men and women was maintained despite commonalities among these other 
characteristics.
Table B2 shows that support for government regulation of interest 
rates (Question 28) varied as a function of political/social views (Question 
25). As one might expect, liberals, more so than conservatives, were more 
likely to favor government regulation of interest rates. However, somewhat 
surprisingly, even among those who identified themselves as very con-
servative, the majority (57%) believed that government should set limits on 
interest rates. Table B3 shows a similar relationship among political party 
and endorsement of government regulation of interest rates. Democrats 
were more likely to favor government regulation of interest rates than Re-
publicans, but even among Republicans, 74% endorsed government regula-
tion. Although not reported in Appendix B, we found a similar pattern of 
responses for the more specific questions about government regulation of 
interest rates for credit cards (Question 8) and short-term loans (Question 
17).
Considered collectively, these data show deep, bipartisan public sup-
port for interest rate caps and raise abiding questions about whether the 
political system is working to create consumer protection laws that the 
public supports and desires. Based upon these data and assuming that poli-
ticians are elected to enact laws supported by the public, all politicians 
(regardless of political party) should support interest rate caps on either a 
state or national level.
CONCLUSION
Our data show widespread support for interest rate caps in two set-
tings, credit cards and high-interest, payday and title-style loans. There is 
now a large body of survey data indicating that most Americans believe in 
interest rate caps. While our data show that more people who favor interest 
rate cap legislation are Democrats, the data also show that over 57% of 
people who report being “very conservative” politically and over 82% of 
those who report being “conservative” politically favor interest rate caps 
over no interest rate caps. Even in New Mexico, where there generally are 
no interest rate caps, the general public overwhelmingly favors caps.
the theory that democrats would be more likely as a whole to support interest rate caps that republicans, 
given that republicans generally favor less regulation rather than more. While this hypothesis proved 
true, a far larger percentage of republicans than we would have anticipated supported caps on interest 
rates.
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These data raise fundamental questions about why the public is not 
more active in seeking out laws that cap interest. We think we know the 
answer. First, many people incorrectly think interest rates are capped (over 
58% for credit cards and over 43% for short-term loans), when in reality 
these rates are not capped. In other words, people misunderstand and over-
estimate the protection the law currently provides. Second, even among 
those who know that the law provides no caps, most are unaware that lend-
ers currently charge interest rates of 200% or more.
Indeed our data showed that when asked in Question 21, relating to 
the participants’ knowledge of the average interest rate on a short-term 
loan, only 19% of participants knew that the actual rate was 200% or more. 
This means that even in a state in which there are no interest rate caps, 
where lenders regularly charge between 400% and 1,110% per annum for 
consumer loans, and where high-cost lenders are ubiquitous, 81% of the 
public is unaware of the costs of these loans. If the public was aware of 
current lending practices, these data suggest they would support enacting 
interest rate cap legislation.
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APPENDIX A. SURVEY QUESTIONS AND RESPONSES
Below is the full set of survey questions and responses reported for the 
combined 199 participants (N=94 participants in the Public group and 
N=105 participants in the Student group). For questions where the propor-
tions in a column do not sum to 100, then the remaining participants did not 
answer the question.
Question 1. Are you male or female?
Male 34.67
Female 65.33
Question 2. What is your age?
18-30 60.80
31-50 18.09
51 or older 21.11
Question 3. What is your education level?
High School Graduate or GED 39.20
Trade of Vocational Certificate 0.50
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Question 5. What is your annual individual income?
less than $30,000 71.36
$30,000-$59,999 18.09
$60,000-$89,999 7.04
$90,000 or higher 3.52
Question 6. When borrowing money with a credit card, do you believe 
the current law limits or caps the maximum annual percentage interest rate 
that a lender can charge?
No 41.21
Yes 58.29
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Question 7. If you answered yes to the previous question, which of the 
rates below do you believe is closest to the maximum annual percentage 
interest rate allowed by law for money borrowed on a credit card?




200% or higher 1.51
I believe there is no maximum rate 40.2050
Question 8. When borrowing money with a credit card, do you think 




Question 9. If you answered yes to the previous question, which of the 
rates below is closest to what should be the maximum annual percentage 
interest rate allowed by law for credit card loans?




200% or higher 0.00
I believe there should not be a maximum rate 9.55
Question 10. Assume Sally charged items on her credit card, and the 
credit card company knew that Sally would not be able to pay back the 
amount borrowed. Do you believe it is legal for the lender to still allow her 
to borrow the money?
No 58.79
Yes 40.70
50. When there are slight variations in results from table to table, say between this figure and the 
first figure in Table 6, it means that once in a while, a person said they thought there was no cap, but 
then chose a cap in the next question. This was fairly rare, as these data show.
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Question 11. How often do you think people pay off the full loan 
amount on credit card loans each month?
Rarely, if ever 27.64
20% of the time 40.70
40% of the time 19.10
60% of the time 9.55
80% of the time 2.01
Almost always 0.50
Question 12. On average, what would you guess is the actual annual 
percentage interest rate charged on credit card loans?




200% or higher 1.01
Question 13. Have you ever borrowed money with a credit card?
No 53.77
Yes 45.23
Question 14. If you answered yes to the previous question, what is the 
largest balance (amount rolled over from month to month) that you have 
ever carried on a credit card?
less than $1,000 18.59
$1,000 to $4,999 13.57
$5,000 to $9,999 9.05
$10,000 to $19,999 4.52
$20,000 or more 1.51
I have never carried a balance on a credit card loan 52.76
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Question 15. When borrowing money with a short-term loan, do you 
believe the current law limits or caps the maximum annual percentage in-
terest rate that a lender can charge?
No 56.28
Yes 43.22
Question 16. If you answered yes to the previous question, which of 
the rates below do you believe is closest to the maximum annual percent-
age interest rate allowed by law for money borrowed on a short-term loan?




200% or higher 4.52
I believe there is no maximum rate 51.26
Question 17. When borrowing money with a short-term loan, do you 
think the current law should limit or cap the maximum annual percentage 
interest rate a lender can charge?
No 13.07
Yes 86.43
Question 18. If you answered yes to the previous question, which of 
the rates below is closest to what should be the maximum annual percent-
age interest rate allowed by law for short-term loans?




200% or higher 0.00
I believe there should not be a maximum rate 12.06
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Question 19. Assume Sally took out a short-term loan, and the lend-
er knew that Sally would not be able to pay back the amount borrowed. Do 
you believe it is legal for the lender to still allow her to borrow the money?
No 56.28
Yes 43.22
Question 20. How often do you think people pay off short-term loans 
under the loan terms, without borrowing the money again right away?
Rarely, if ever 25.63
20% of the time 28.64
40% of the time 22.11
60% of the time 15.08
80% of the time 5.53
Almost always 2.51
Question 21. On average, what would you guess is the actual annual 
percentage interest rate charged on short-term loans?




200% or higher 18.59
Question 22. Have you ever taken out a short-term loan?
No 76.38
Yes 22.61
Question 23. If you answered yes to the previous question, what is the 
largest short-term loan you have had?
less than $1,000 10.55
$1,000 to $4,999 9.05
$5,000 to $9,999 3.52
$10,000 to $19,999 0.50
I have never had a short-term loan 76.38
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not very religious 16.58
not religious at all 23.12




138 CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW [Vol 89:1
APPENDIX B: CROSSTAB ANALYSES OF SELECTED QUESTIONS
Below are crosstab analyses of selected pairs of questions. In each case, the 
combined group of 199 participants was used. The numbers in each cell refer to the 
proportion of respondents who answered the first question (row) one way, broken 
out by how they answered the second question (column). If the proportions in the 
rows vary significantly, then there is a dependency on how respondents answered 
the two questions. The last row in each table shows the proportion of responses 
collapsing across the row categories.
Table B1. Comparison of Question 25 (row: How would you rate your politi-
cal/social views?) and Question 1 (column: Are you male or female?). Chi-square 
= 10.18, p < .05
Male Female Totals
very conservative 60.00 40.00 100
conservative 29.41 70.59 100
neutral 43.28 56.72 100
liberal 24.07 75.93 100
very liberal 27.59 72.41 100
Total 34.67 65.33 100
Table B2. Comparison of Question 25 (row: How would you rate your 
political/social views?) and Question 28 (column: Do you believe the gov-
ernment should set limits on interest rates?). Chi-square = 30.89, p < .01
No Yes Totals
very conservative 42.86 57.14 100
conservative 17.65 82.35 100
neutral 14.93 85.07 100
liberal 1.85 98.15 100
very liberal 6.90 93.10 100
Total 12.56 86.93 100
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Table B3. Comparison of Question 24 (row: With which political par-
ty are you registered?) and Question 28 (column: Do you believe the gov-
ernment should set limits on interest rates?). Chi-square = 11.26, p<.05
No Yes Totals
Democrat 5.68 94.32 100
Republican 26.19 73.81 100
Independent 10.34 89.66 100
None 15.38 84.62 100
Total 12.56 86.93 100

